Inter-organisational coordination of H1N1 outbreak: data collection, and analyses of a pilot field study by Carlsson, S et al.
Title Inter-organisational coordination of H1N1 outbreak: datacollection, and analyses of a pilot field study
Author(s) Bdeir, F; Hossain, L; Crawford, J; Carlsson, S
Citation Journal of Decision Systems, 2014, v. 23 n. 2, p. 151-166
Issued Date 2014
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10722/203489
Rights
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published in
Journal of Decision Systems, 2014, v. 23 n. 2, p. 151-166. The
article is available online at:
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/12460125.2014.8961
22
Inter-organisational coordination data collection and analyses of H1N1 
outbreak: A pilot field study 
Fadl Bdeir1*, Prof Liaquat Hossain2§*, Prof John Crawford3*, Sven Carlsson# 
1Centre for Complex Systems research, The University of Sydney, Darlington, 2006, 
Australia 
2   Professor, Information Management 
Division of Information and Technology Studies 
The University of Hong Kong 
lhossain@hku.hk 
 
Honorary Professor, Complex Systems 
School of Civil Engineering 
Faculty of Engineering and IT 
The University of Sydney, Australia 
Liaquat.hossain@sydney.edu.au 
 
3 Scientific Director-Sustainable Systems 
Rothamsted Research 
West Common, Harpenden 
Hertfordshire, AL5 2JQ, UK 
Email: john.crawford@rothamsted.ac.uk 
 
#Department of Informatics, Lund University, Sweden 
*These authors contributed equally to this work 
§Corresponding author 
 
Email addresses: 
FB: fadl.bdeir@sydney.edu.au 
LH: liaquat.hossain@sydney.edu.au 
JC: John.Crawford@sydney.edu.au 
SC: sven.carlsson@ics.lu.se 
Inter-organisational coordination data collection and analyses of H1N1 
outbreak: A pilot field study 
Improving effectiveness in response to H1N1 outbreaks requires us to understand how 
different organisations within the outbreak coordination network work collectively to 
share information needed to operate at optimal level. Research for developing reliable 
framework for the collection of inter-organisational coordinated response data and its 
impact on decision-making and support system for disease outbreak is lacking to date.  
We introduce a pilot field study using social networks based approach to capture H1N1 
inter-organisational coordination data by introducing qualitative questionnaire and 
quantitative survey, which resulted in discovering the hidden social networks of 
coordination. Here, we propose a schema that can be used to classify the quantitative 
data collection and preparation for further empirical analysis and suggest that lessons 
learned from this can be applied to explore possible data collection and analysis for 
other types of natural and man made crises. 
Keywords: H1N1 outbreak coordination, Swine flu management, inter-
organisational coordination, network analysis methods. 
Subject classification codes: include these here if the journal requires them 
Introduction 
Sharing reliable information is one of the main challenges in any scenario that requires 
coordination. This is specifically emphasised in crisis in which timely and accuracy of 
information is a prerequisite to successful coordination. Pandemics management is a 
complex domain where many players from different organisational structures and skills 
need to communicate efficiently and timely. We propose a communication schema that 
can be used to study the communication patterns during large disease outbreaks. The 
schema was grounded on qualitative study followed by quantitative survey developed in 
cooperation which health officials who were heavily involved in the swine flu H1N1 
2009 outbreak. This paper starts by introducing some background information about the 
nature of the problem and then stating the necessity to deal with complex coordination 
as social networks structure rather than hierarchal one. Then we discuss the qualitative 
questionnaire that was developed to collect information about processes and 
communication that took place in H1N1 2009 outbreak in Hunter New England (HNE) 
local health district in New South Wales Australia. Findings are presented graphically. 
Then we use these findings to develop the quantitative survey, along with the schema, 
which the survey is meant to populate. This paper ends with presenting some 
conclusions and suggesting future paths for this research.  
Background 
Inter-organisational coordination has been the subject of many research quests rom 
different perspectives including information collection, sharing and coordination during 
disasters mainly due to the challenges of such collaboration effort [1].  
Coordination is increasingly seen to be important as organisations become more reliant 
on interdisciplinary teams of specialties and distributed operations for addressing 
complicated situations demanding a multi organisational response. The Oxford English 
Dictionary defines coordination as a ‘harmonious combination of agents or functions 
toward the production of a result’. 
Malone & Crowston [2] defined coordination as ‘the act of managing interdependencies 
between activities performed to achieve a goal’. In its simplest concept, coordination 
merges the activities of many disciplines and organisations together to achieve desired 
goals and objectives. It describes both processes and the goals and is particularly 
challenging where the chains of interaction are complex and long [3]. This definition is 
consistent with a long history in organisational theory of emphasising the importance of 
interdependence [4-7]. The later literature evolved by introducing “interdependency” as 
a key term to describe coordination. This was accompanied by the advancement of 
information and communication technologies (ICT) as well as by organisational 
development from hierarchical structures into more complex ones that could not be 
handled by a single person’s perspective [8]; deducing that completely centralised 
control became simply unfeasible [9].  
 
Figure 1: Coordination development with organisations along with the evolution of 
coordination mechanisms (lower part adopted from Mintzberg [10] 
 
Figure 1 further illustrates the different characteristics of coordination as it 
phases between hierarchical structures and networked ones, superimposed of 
coordination not of control on Mintzberg’s well-known coordination mechanisms. The 
new mutual adjustment or horizontal coordination [8] are the most significant 
contemporary development in organisation design [11]. 
 Research in coordination is therefore an interdisciplinary study that assists in 
building useful cooperative work tools for supporting activities, actor relations, and 
their interdependencies for achieving goals collectively. 
Networked Coordination and communication in disasters 
Complexity of coordination in multi-agency dynamic environments during crisis and 
disasters has been studied by Kapucu [12] and Hossain & Kuti [13] using a framework 
primarily drawn from both dynamic networks complex adaptive systems theories. 
Kapucu observed that coordination in extreme events is guided by a group of 
interconnected actors who necessarily rely on each other to achieve the goals 
collectively [14]. 
Being a major facet of coordination, communication has been further studied by 
Feczak and Hossain [15] within the context of temporal team dynamics for bug fixing 
behaviour during open source software lifecycle management. A study by Miller & 
Moser suggests that ‘Communication can play a key role in the ability of agents to 
reach, and maintain, superior coordination’ [16]. The two concepts are linked together 
because communication can be regarded as a necessary precedent to coordination.  
Therefore, effective coordination related to timely decision support relies 
heavily on types, quality and quantity of information flow that passes through different 
organisational settings. The challenge is to develop a common multijurisdictional 
coordinated decision support that can detect and support the flow of information 
required to deal with the crisis. We therefore investigate disease outbreak management 
and intervention as a coordination effort involving many stakeholders such as public 
health officials, hospitals, epidemiologists, logistics, etc.  
Disease outbreak coordination 
Disease outbreak is a unique form of disasters whereas it can start alone or can 
accompany other form of disasters (floods, earthquakes) due to dramatic changes in the 
population welfare and resources. Outbreaks also evolve in a dynamic environment 
(population movement, travel) in which coordination mechanisms must be also dynamic 
to adapt to the consequences of disease spread. Therefore, the coordination structure for 
disease outbreaks cannot be modelled or analysed using current standard and static 
coordination methods that focus on market theory proposed by Malone & Crowston 
[17]. The concept of dynamic emerging coordination is better suited to model the inter-
organisational communication where agencies have a tendency to establish, drop, and 
enhance communication links over time in order to achieve the optimal coordination 
scheme [18]. Hence using the networked approach, emerging coordination can be best 
modelled as a complex adaptive system where the organisations are interacting 
dynamically with each other within a large meshed networked environment. 
The organisations interacting during pandemic process represents a unique form 
of inter-organisational coordination. They create a matrix of inter-disciplinary agencies 
coordinating within certain time constraints (i.e., disease infectivity characteristics).  
It is essential to capture such communication patterns to investigate its dynamics and 
further analyse its performance. 
Methodology and Data Collection 
In order to understand the complexity of such a task, the first step was to explore some 
of the activities that are usually performed during disease outbreaks. Some of these 
tasks are: 
• Surveillance and monitoring: Is the ongoing collection, reporting and analysis of 
public health data in a systematic manner to detect and monitor communicable 
diseases [19]. 
• Public communication: communicating outbreak information updates to the 
public via different media outlets (TV, radio, internet, leaflets…).  
• Case definitions: Set of criteria used to classify patients of having a defined 
illness.  
• Logistics: transporting different material that deals with the outbreak 
management and intervention such as, pathology samples, PPE (Personal 
protective equipment), Anti-pathogen etc.…  
• Outbreak information updates between different public/private/international 
organisations. 
• Population screening: Testing certain population against infection. Like border 
quarantine services. 
• Epidemiological services: Usually monitors disease incidence a specific region 
to develop and analyse statistical data to determine at-risk populations and 
geographical locations of occurrences. 
• Coordination services: Some agencies role is to route data and coordinate 
actions between different organisations. This activity is usually performed by 
state or federal management agencies for dealing with the crisis emerging from 
the disease outbreaks.  
• Diagnosis and treatment: Done by hospitals and other health service centres.  
After elaborating the heterogeneity of tasks and organisations that collaborate 
during infectious disease outbreaks; such diversity mandates the creation of the inter-
organisational links. Below is the type of data needs to be collected: 
• Organisations: What type of services does the organisation provides? This will 
determine whom and why the links are formed and will provide reason for 
creating the Inter-organisational coordination (IOC) structure; 
• Organisational links: The process of receiving or initiating link to another 
agency. This will form the IOC structure which will be further studied and 
researched; 
• Link initiation: Usually the agency that is initiating the link to another one 
suggests that it is in need of the services of the second one implying a 
dependency relationship of the first to the second; 
• Tie strength: This is the number of links between two specific organisations. 
These might be created at different periods of the coordination lifetime. The 
intensity will quantify dyadic dependency between both organisations; 
• Links timeline: It is assumed that the need for services/ resources will change 
during different phases of the outbreak. Hence, some organisations might need 
to interfere at earlier or later stages of the outbreak timeline; 
• Link purpose: This deals with investigating the reason that enticed one 
organisation to outreach the other and explores whether it is due to resource 
need or information demand or other. 
However, there is a lack of international consensus regarding best practice for 
collecting data on natural disasters. Along with the complexity of collecting information 
in disasters due to the constraints of time, funding, and the complexity of the situation, 
there also remains huge variability in definitions, methodologies, sources, and data 
points collected [20]. 
 
Multiagency coordination data collection design process 
This section discusses the two phases of the data collection. 
Exploratory phase: 
After deciding the data that is needed; we decided to start with the qualitative data 
collection method by interviewing subject matter experts responsible for managing and 
participating in the H1N1 2009 coordination efforts.  
Initiating data collection qualitatively provides valuable insight about the culture 
and practices within emergency management organisations as well as the agencies 
involved in disease outbreak incidents. This will also provide a cumulative view about 
how the organisations coordinate during the outbreak and may answer important 
research questions such as what are the characteristics of the organisations that play a 
central role during the coordination evolution. Qualitative data collection will enable us 
to identify the initiation points and end points for the multi-agency coordination 
process. It may further assist in closely examining the flow of information within 
organizations and enable better understanding the information flow in this large 
complex network. In summary, qualitative approach described here enables us to gain 
the following understanding: 
• An exploratory exposure about the type of organisations that work together 
during infectious diseases; 
• Understanding the meta-value of these links, as in what does these links convey 
between the organisations whether it is information or resources exchange; and, 
• Quantifying the links that exist between these organisations. 
Introducing the qualitative questionnaire 
These initial high-level requirements enabled developing the qualitative questionnaire. 
Prior to instrument development and validation of preliminary ideas of initial 
conceptual model, it was decided that the ideas need to be confirmed from the field – 
that is, the disease outbreak personnel themselves. Therefore, in order to elicit a richer 
understanding of disease outbreak coordination structure and performance (from the 
disease outbreak personnel’s perspective), semi-structured in-depth interviews were 
conducted. The interview questions were designed and planned carefully so that when 
executed, a systematic flow to the data collection process was achieved [21, 22]. The 
questions were constructed in such a way so as to avoid resistance, prejudice and any 
sorts of negative forces within the interview environment. The main interview questions 
are outlined in table 1 below. 
 
Section: Example Questions  
Situational information How is outbreak detected? 
How is information routed? 
What are the outbreak criteria? 
What are the containment criteria? 
Actors Identifying the organizations involved. 
Identifying organizational characteristics 
(jurisdiction/domain/location…) 
Organizational role: how and when do they get involved 
in the outbreak? 
What is their communication plan and protocols? 
Processes Information production filtering and distribution. 
Identifying parties involved in each part of information 
routing phases. 
The inputs feeds and outcome of the decision support 
system. 
Determinants How to measure coordination gaps? 
What are the criteria to determine that coordination is 
successful? 
Can we use epidemiological measures as performance 
indicators? Historical data?  
Table 1. Qualitative questionnaire main questions. 
 
Targeted Audience 
The qualitative questionnaire was designed to target the decision makers, coordinators 
and middle level managers within the public health system. These usually act as 
gatekeepers for incoming and outgoing communication within their organizations. 
Table 2 presents the proposed matrix for each section of the questions along with the 
proposed interviewees – these positions has been generalized to suite different health 
authority structures or names that might differ from one state or country to another.  
Section  Proposed Interviewee  
A. Situational Information Policy and decsions makers/Biosecurity 
authorities/Emergency management 
authorities. 
B. Actors Coordination units / Clinical 
managers/Logistics/Public Health Units/ 
Emergecy management  authorities 
C. Processes  Mid level or unit managers/Logistics / 
Epidemiologists/Clinical and suveillance 
units/ Biosecurity authorities. 
D. Determinants Policy and decsions makers/ coordination 
units.  
Table 2. Qualitative questionnaire intended interviewees 
The responses to the qualitative questionnaire were aimed at establishing the two 
following repositories: 
• Domain schema: A basic knowledge of the terminologies/processes/ workspace 
environment and sphere of the outbreak management; and, 
• Organizational matrix: An initial pool of organizations / units that will be used 
to select the interviewees during the following quantitative phase.   
Quantitative corpus 
In conjunction with qualitative interviews conducted with subject matter experts, the 
framework was used to further develop and refine a valid and reliable survey 
instrument. The quantitative method includes a non-traditional “networks” method of 
data collection and analysis to serve as a fine complement to traditional research 
methods in behavioural studies. The survey for this study is essentially designed to 
cover three broad constructs – social networks, coordination and performance. More 
importantly, the quantitative research method adds further empirical weight to the 
disease outbreak coordination model by explaining with quantitative evidence how 
network properties are associated with coordination. 
The relational quality of network methods requires shift in thinking when it 
comes to research methodology. Network approach focus on relations between nodes 
(organisations in our case) rather than relationships between subjects’ attributes. Hence 
study design, data collection, and data analysis incorporate this relational perspective 
requiring unique approaches to each [23]. Data collection perspective will focus on data 
about nodes and their relations which each other: 
• Nodes: As discussed, these represent organisations that have a role in the 
outbreak management and containment. Table 3 below presents a corpus that 
links variables to data type. These variables can be used for computational data 
analysis. 
• Relationships: These are usually expressed by exchange of communication or 
resources and are called “ties” or “links”. They are actually what creates the 
coordination dynamics. These ties represent the existence of coordination event 
between two nodes at a point of time and are presented in table 4 below. 
These two schema tables (tables 3 and 4) were designed so that it will be populated with 
the quantitative results. The first one presented in table 3 below is used to store 
information about the characteristics of each organisation. Each variable has certain 
data associated with it. This is meant to build a meta-data about each organisation that 
will facilitate more analysis at later stage.  
Variable Data  Notes 
ORG_NAME Organisation name  
ORG_TYPE Organisation type: 
● International. 
● Federal. 
● Local. 
● Private. 
● Other. 
Identify the 
jurisdictional level 
of each organisation. 
ORG_ROLE1....n ● Leadership and guidance. 
● Information collection. 
Deals with 
organisational role 
● Information analysis and 
dissemination. 
● Training. 
● Liaison with other 
organisations.  
● Resource provisioning. 
● Logistical support. 
● Epidemiology. 
● Community education. 
● Care. (Hospitals) 
● Emergency Care. 
of the coordination 
process. 
Organisations might 
have multiple roles.  
ORG_PRE Has this organisation been 
predefined as one that 
involvement in outbreak 
coordination? 
In many disasters: 
New organisations 
that were not part of 
the plan are usually 
pulled to the 
coordination 
structure as result of 
unpredicted need.  
Table 3. Organisational characteristics schema. 
Also networked relationships requires links between the organisations, hence 
another schema is used as a repository for information about these links. Table 4 below 
shows this schema along with the interpretation of each variable.  
Variable Data Notes 
LINK_NUM Number of coordination 
instances between ORG_1 and 
ORG_2 
Number of links 
between two 
organisations. 
LINK_INI [ORG_Name] Organisation that 
initiates the link 
LINK_END [ORG_Name] The organisation that 
the link is directed to. 
LINK_TYPE Type of Coordination: can be:  
● Providing information. 
● Receiving information. 
● Resource request. 
● Resource supply. 
● Fieldwork. 
● Other. 
Information about the 
resource or 
information exchange 
that this link 
facilitated. 
LINK_FREQ Coordination frequency: 
● Daily. 
● Weekly. 
● Monthly. 
● Semi Annually. 
● Annually. 
Link frequency 
measures the link 
strength and 
dependencies 
between 
organisations. 
LINK_COMM_METH Coordination method: 
● Land line Phone 
● Mobile Phone 
● Fax 
● Email. 
● Messages. 
● Web portal 
● Social Media 
Communication 
media. 
Table 4. Relational corpus 
Targeted Audience 
In order to build an understanding of the epidemic management network, a diverse type 
of health professionals in various positions and skill sets will be need to provide input to 
populate the quantitative schema. These positions range from emergency care provider 
to clinicians and epidemiologists. Table 5 below shows some of those positions that 
would participate in the survey. 
Working Field Positions Example  Notes 
Clinical care Doctors, Nurses.   
Policy decision makers Senior public health 
officials.  
 
Emergency Management Emergency care 
professionals, Intensive 
care unit professionals. 
 
Logistics Ambulance Services.  
Public Health Public Heath unit, 
epidemiologists. 
 
Detection and Surveillance Labs, GPs, Infectious 
disease centres.  
 
Table 3. Participants Job title and responsibility 
Results  
In this section, we provide a preliminary overview of the results of both qualitative and 
quantitative surveys we performed within “Hunter New England” Area Health Service 
of the New South Wales (NSW) state in Australia. The intention of this overview is 
only to demonstrate the usage and applicability of the qualitative questionnaire and the 
quantitative corpus.  
Our case study examines the coordination scenario that took place in 2009 when 
WHO declared the swine flu H1N1 2009 virus endemic. Australia had its first 
confirmed swine flu case in Brisbane on 7 May 2009 on an international flight. 
Worldwide WHO figures reported 4.4 fold case increases during June 2009 in 
confirmed cases whereas in Australia there were 13.4 fold case increases for the same 
period. The higher Australian rate can be partially attributed to the coinciding influenza 
season due to the southern winter season [24].  
In this case, study, we explore the multi-agency coordination and 
communication that took place in Hunter New England Area Health Services 
(HNEAHS) during the endemic. HNEAHS is located in northern NSW within a 
geographical area of over 130,000 square kilometres, spans 25 local council areas, and 
has a population of about 870,000 inhabitants. HNEAHS is unique in that it is the only 
health service in NSW with a major metropolitan centre (Newcastle/Lake Macquarie) as 
well as a mix of several large regional centres and many smaller rural centres as well as 
remote communities within its borders. HNEAHS activates the Health Service 
Functional Area Coordination (HSFAC) centre during major health crises. HSFAC is 
responsible for leading the management of response operations from the high-level 
perspective, providing intelligence and guidance, as well as monitoring the cases 
reported by the “Front Line” (i.e., ED, GPs and other relevant health professionals).  
The qualitative questionnaire was first used in the first wave of interviews 
conducted in November 2010 with three HSFAC senior personnel in HNEAHS so to get 
the first insights of the agencies, methodologies and procedures of the H1N1 2009 
outbreak coordination efforts. The interviews questions we extracted from the ones 
presented in table 1 and discussed in Semi structured interviews with the three HSFAC 
senior managers. Below are some of the results of these interviews. 
Qualitative Results 
The interview results presented in this section are the extracts of the responses of the 
qualitative interviews organised so to address the main research questions discussed in 
the methods section. These results will not be presented here critically rather we will 
suffice with demonstrating them. 
Situational information: How is the outbreak is detected? 
The outbreak is detected in different methods: 
a. Patients presenting themselves at the emergency departments (EDs) 
within the public hospitals. Those patients might have ILI (Influenza like 
illness). The patients are “swabbed” to confirm that they are H1N1 
positive. Furthermore, all patients details are added to the PHREDDS 
system (Public Health Respiratory Emergency Department System) 
which is a state wide system. This system provides a holistic view of the 
respiratory cases details and numbers within NSW enabling to discover 
geographical clusters through data mining and pattern analysis. 
b. It was thought that general practitioners GPs would play a secondary role 
in detecting the outbreak where the forecast – and plan - was that 
potential patients would be channelled to the public hospitals emergency 
departments. Yet this turned out not to be the case as people with flu 
symptoms continued to present themselves to their local GPs  
c. Containment was a hard criterion to measure since outbreaks do not drop 
suddenly rather they tail off for a period of time. Yet, “tailing off” 
provides a good indicator that the number of reported cases is withering 
away. 
Actors: Many organisations played role in H1N1 2009 outbreak management, 
intervention and containment. These range from the international ones down to federal / 
commonwealth then state and lastly local level. Table 6 below is a list of the 
organisations, roles and jurisdictional level. This list is by no means comprehensive.  
Name Jurisdiction Role 
World Health 
organisation 
Global Provide advise, 
information (Such as 
“case definitions”) and 
surveillance 
Chief Medial 
Officer 
Commonwealth Heads the states 
meetings and makes 
decisions on change 
epidemic phases (delay, 
contain, protect)  
Chief Health 
officer 
State Makes State wide 
decisions, coordinate 
between different Area 
Health Services, 
Resource provisioning  
Communicable 
Disease Branch 
State Collect, aggregate and 
analyse state wide 
communicable disease 
data. Provide advice to 
Area Health Services. 
Public Health 
Unit (PHU) 
Local Communicate with 
hospitals about cases 
and follow up on 
patients, provide 
information to local 
community. 
Emergency 
department 
Local Receive patients, test 
and provide medical 
treatment. 
Intensive care 
unit 
Local Clinical treatment to ill 
patients who need 
special care 
(ventilators). 
HSFAC Local Coordinate information 
flow and resources. 
Ambulance State Provide Personal 
Protective Equipment 
(PPE) from the state 
stockpile. 
Table 6. Some of the organisations that participated in H1N1 2009 Coordination in 
Hunter New England, NSW, Australia 
Processes: Here, we elicit information flow for patients presenting themselves at the 
emergency departments (EDs). When someone presents himself/herself at the ED 
having respiratory illness she is “swabbed” – specimen taken from nasal discharge – 
and the swab is sent to the lab (either hospital or reference lab). The public health unit 
PHU is notified so it can follow up the patient if she discharged. The Lab later confirms 
back the results and the Communicable Disease branch (CDB) -which is a statewide 
organisation, and is notified if it the reported result was positive.   Then a follow up 
process is initiated by the PHU depending on the policy and patient condition, for 
example, it might be decided that the patient will need to be home-isolated, hence the 
procedures will be explained to her over the phone and isolation pack which consists of 
masks, gel, and gloves will be dispatched to her. 
Determinants: There are different ways to look at successful intervention and 
coordination for outbreaks; one of them is accurate and fast distribution of information 
and resources. Another is that procedures and plans are disseminated quickly to all EDs 
so to enable accurate and coherent patients’ screening.  
Resource management:  Coordination not only aims to disseminate accurate and 
updated information, but resources such as vaccine, personal protective equipment 
(PPE). Such resources are managed by NSW Ambulance service at NSW state level and 
by department of Health and aging (DoHA) at the Federal level.  
Quantitative results 
After the preliminary understanding of the dynamics of the coordination results, follow 
up interviews with seven public health officials, health practitioners, and 
epidemiologists for the same geographical area, Hunter New England, were conducted. 
Based on the interviews with the subject matter experts and the grounded data 
collected. A conceptual illustration of some of the tasks and organisations involved in 
outbreaks is illustrated in figure 2 below. This conceptual illustration of the model is 
divided into four quadrants so as to emphasize on the leading agencies for each task. 
These tasks start from surveillance and detection, to communication and management 
ending in logistics. These doesn’t reflect any timely division of the tasks, rather it 
reflects their general categories.  The Detection quadrant represents the sentinels that 
can be used to detect outbreaks early. These might be as simple as noting that the sales 
of specific drug surges in local pharmacies in certain area, the surge of the number of 
patients with certain symptoms -like influenza likes illness (ILI) - presenting themselves 
in Emergency Departments (EDs), or microbiology labs reporting a rise of positive 
results for specific communicable disease. These results are usually communicated to 
local public health authorities that can aggregate data from other sources and then 
analyse it against historical trends or other pattern analysis methods so as to determine 
the extent and the magnitude of the outbreak.  
 
Figure 2. Organisational communication quadrants.  
 The communication quadrant demonstrations the expected communication 
channels after detection. The local health authorities act according to protocols in place 
and report to “higher level” health authorities being state/federal or the like. 
Consequently, local health authorities also maintain communication with other 
authorities such as WHO, emergency management centres, etc. Local health authorities 
further formulate a communication strategy to keep the public and media informed. 
Such strategies are built around transparency and not arousing public panic rather 
creating health awareness and promoting safe contact procedures. 
Most of the communication in this quadrant takes place according to pre-defined 
protocols and communication lines. Yet messages –especially ones that are addressing 
the public – can’t be premeditated whereas the general schema of the disease dictates 
some of the content. Another important type of communication in pandemics is the 
“case definition”, which is a set of criteria and conditions that defines who is infected. 
Case definitions need to be normalised and standardised for many reasons one of which 
is to accurately determine the cases and hence report them. In global pandemics case 
definitions are produced by World Health Organisation (WHO) and disseminated to 
countries’ health authorities that would decide to customise and adapt them. 
The management quadrant is where most of the communication and information 
are made available for decision makers. They utilise these data to initiate the response 
by activating different emergency management authorities. The agencies within this 
quadrant usually make high-level management decisions like on which sections of the 
management plan are to be activated. All the information gathered from health 
authorities and other parties are analysed and invested to decide the intervention 
strategy, which in turn is communicated back to combat agencies. 
 The Logistics quadrant is where agencies mobilise different resources to 
organisations or individuals who need them. These might be vaccines, Personal 
Protective Equipment (PPE), isolation packs, ventilators and the like. Performing these 
activities effectively requires constant feedback from intervention management 
committees and feedback about the available resources who are part of combat 
agencies. 
Furthermore, the quantitative interviews aimed at populating the data in tables 3 and 4 
above hence building a matrix of relationships between different organisations and 
trying to understand the context of their coordination links.    
These results are then presented as network chart visualising the organisations and their 
links. We discuss here two networks only. The first is the flow of case definition from 
the global level to the local level and the second from to the local level to the “front 
line” being the ED in this scenario. 
1. Global Case definition inbound flow  
Case definitions are one-page brief communication stating the symptoms and criteria 
under which the people can be considered as “cases” i.e., positively treated as being 
infected. Then the procedures of patient management (isolation, treatment…) apply to 
them. It is very important to communicate the case definition from the originating 
authority to the front line as fast and accurate as possible since this will ensure shared 
understanding and management across the health system. Case definition is also the 
basis for the filtering procedures which increases the accuracy of detected cases hence 
reducing the costs and logistics for managing. Usually case definitions are created by 
the world health organisation (WHO), and then disseminated to countries whom can 
either adopt them without change or modify them according to their local environment 
and procedures.  
 Figure 3 below shows inbound H1N1 2009 case definition communication path starting 
from the World Health Organisation to the HNE HSFAC. Such communication was 
through the standard hierarchal communication channels that ensured standardised case 
definitions nationwide 
 
WHO
Federal Chief Health 
Officer
CDU:
NSW Chief Health 
Officer/NSW 
HSFAC
HNE - HSFAC
 
Figure 3. Global Inbound Case definition 
2- Local Case definition communication to EDs 
The communication plan displayed in figure 4 below represents the communication 
links starting from the state public health and ending at the 37 EDs in all the HNE 
hospitals. These links are primarily used to distribute quick and intelligent information 
such as case definitions rather than standard operating manuals and polices which in 
turn were posted on the HNE website for further reference. Also, the same structure is 
used to receive feedback acknowledgment of case definition deployment into the 
system. 
State Public Health 
Unit
Case definition outbound 
communication structure
HSFAC DCO
DCO: Director of clinical Operations.
DA: Director of Acute.
ED: Emergency Department
Director 
Acute
Director
D+C
Director
Mental 
Health
7 Hospital 
in HNE
Total 37 ED
EDs
Hospital Clusters
EDs
Mental 
Hospital
 
 
Figure 4. Outbound communication 
 
The HSAFC has strategically positioned itself on the path of communication that 
bridges the state public health system and the director of clinical operations (DCO). By 
covering this structural hole, they are able to control and filter the information flow 
between the two nodes to the benefit of the ED nodes that are linked to the DCO. 
Hence, the dissemination of the case definition is reduced from four hours to thirty 
minutes including the acknowledgment from the EDs that the new case definition has 
been imported into the system. It can be noticed that HSFAC wasn’t positioned in 
highly central location with lots of branches so that it is not overburdened with a 
communication overhead. They actually elicited the DCO’s high degree centrality and 
its existing communication channels to pass the intended communication.  
Conclusion  
This paper seeks to contribute to an improved interorganisational data collection during 
pandemics. To do so, a qualitative questionnaire and a quantitative corpus is proposed  
to capture Inter-organisational coordination data and prepare it for further analysis. This 
approach help facilitates closer view into the disease outbreak’s culture and practices 
and discover the characteristics of Inter-organisational disease outbreak coordination. 
Beyound data collection, the next step is to arrange, clean and organise the data to  
perpare it for analysis. It would be useful then to conduct organisational collaboration 
evaluation and statistical analysis to investigate disease outbreak coordination from a 
social networks perspective. Furthermore, whole network analysis conceptual tools such 
as centrality, cliques and structural equivalence analyses can then be conducted which 
would provide an indepth picture  for the understanding of network and performance 
patterns at the macro-level. For further research, it would useful to apply the existing 
data collection procedure to the context of another domain, preferably one that shares 
characteristics of uncertainty and unstable environments. For example, the tool could be 
applied to a range of other crisis and emergency events (e.g. floods) to capture social 
network and coordination data. 
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